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Although private school voucher programs provide subsidies to students for tuition and other 
education-related costs, private school leaders weigh program participation against any 
associated regulatory costs. The higher the regulatory costs of participation, the less likely a 
private school is to participate in a school voucher program. Since we do not know with certainty 
which regulations will be viewed by school leaders as more or less costly, we explore whether 
specific regulations that are common to private school choice programs do or do not deter likely 
voucher program participation.  
 We use surveys to randomly assign different regulations to 4,825 private school leaders 
in the states of California and New York and ask them whether or not they would participate in a 
new private school choice program during the following school year. Relative to no regulations, 
our most conservative models find that open-enrollment mandates reduce the likelihood that 
private school leaders are certain to participate in a hypothetical choice program by about 19 
percentage points, or 60 percent. State standardized testing requirements reduce the likelihood 
that private school leaders are certain to participate by 9 percentage points, or 29 percent. We 
find no evidence to suggest that the prohibition of copayment or nationally norm-referenced 
testing requirements affect the overall willingness to participate in a school choice program.  
Keywords: private school; school choice; school vouchers; schooling supply; regulations 









As of the fall of 2018, 15 states and the District of Columbia operate 26 private school voucher 
programs (EdChoice, 2018). Nearly 184,000 students are currently using vouchers to offset the 
cost of tuition at a participating private school (EdChoice, 2018). Private school leaders decide 
whether to have their schools participate in these voucher programs each year, often with 
guidance from umbrella organizations such as school boards and archdioceses. As with other 
decisions, a cost-benefit analysis guides school leaders’ decision to participate in a school 
voucher program or to decline participation. If a given private school leader expects that 
additional benefits of participation will exceed the additional costs, the leader will decide to 
participate in the program. The main benefits of participation are additional revenue from the 
voucher and a more expansive customer base, while the main cost is additional government 
regulation. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the regulatory burden associated with program 
participation should decrease the likelihood that private school leaders elect to participate. 
Although other studies find that additional voucher program regulation generally is correlated 
with lower rates of program participation (DeAngelis & Burke, 2017; Sude, DeAngelis, & Wolf, 
2018), none of the existing empirical studies provides causal evidence that regulation reduces 
program participation, and none determines which types of regulations are the most costly to 
private schools. 
Our previous study began to fill this considerable hole in the literature. It presented the 
results of the first experimental evaluation of the effects of frequently promulgated regulations 
on the willingness of private school leaders to participate in a hypothetical voucher program in 
Florida (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2018). We randomly assigned a hypothetical voucher 
program participation offer to 3,080 private school leaders in Florida in 2018. Specifically, we 
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randomly assigned one of three different regulations, or no additional government regulation at 
all, to each of these private school leaders and asked them whether or not they would participate 
in the voucher program the following year. We found that the open-enrollment regulation, 
requiring that the school accept all interested students regardless of their level of preparation, 
decreased the likelihood that private school leaders in Florida were “certain to participate” by 
around 17 percentage points. Standardized testing requirements decreased the likelihood that 
private school leaders were “certain to participate” by around 12 percentage points.  
We add to this literature by replicating that experiment in the states of California and 
New York, randomly assigning a hypothetical voucher program participation offer to 4,825 
private school leaders in these two states. Our study builds upon the Florida evaluation in at least 
four important ways: (1) we examine two states that do not have private school choice programs; 
(2) we add a nationally norm-referenced testing requirement as a new regulatory treatment; (3) 
we include two customer review metrics as proxies for school quality; and, (4) we analyze 
subgroup effects by school specialization. 
In the next section, we examine the theory underlying private school choice participation 
decisions. We then review the limited empirical literature on the question. After that, we describe 
our data and methods. We then spend a few sections discussing the data and methods in detail, 
followed by a presentation of our empirical results, including an exploration of possible 
heterogeneous effects. Our final section concludes with implications for further research and 
program design considerations.   




When deciding whether or not to participate in a private school choice program, private school 
leaders weigh the expected benefits of participation against the expected costs. The major 
benefits associated with school choice program participation include additional funding and 
enrollment, freeing-up resources that can be put toward other school-based scholarships for 
additional students, and the capacity to extend the school’s mission to additional students. School 
leaders are likely to view additional regulations as a cost associated with program participation. 
In theory, raising the costs associated with entering private school choice programs should 
reduce the likelihood that individual schools participate in those programs. This conceptual 
framework suggests private school leaders will only turn down the offer to participate in a 
voucher program if they perceive that additional costs will exceed additional benefits of 
participation. 
 Because any school choice regulation increases the costs of program participation, we 
expect all four of the randomly assigned regulations to have statistically significant negative 
effects on private school leaders’ anticipated participation in the hypothetical program. We 
anticipate that all four regulations– open-enrollment mandates, state standardized testing 
requirements, nationally norm-referenced testing requirements, and the prohibition of a parental 
copayment – are all costly enough to deter private schools from participating in the hypothetical 
private school choice programs. As autonomy is important to private school leaders and the 
families they serve, and since many private schools already use either norm-referenced or state 
standardized tests, we envisage that the regulation requiring an open enrollment admissions 
policy will have the largest negative effects on the likelihood that private school leaders pledge 
to be “certain to participate” in the new private school voucher program. Because many U.S. 
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private schools face difficulties maintaining the enrollment levels necessary to ensure financial 
stability (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Murnane, Reardon, Mbekeani, & Lamb, 2018), we think that 
the prohibition of copayment will have the smallest negative effects on principals’ expressed 
willingness to participate in a hypothetical voucher program. 
 Policymakers and advocacy organizations, rather than private school leaders, tend to 
determine which regulations will be attached to private school voucher funding. Moreover, 
policymakers often change private school choice program regulations over time (Wolf, 2012). As 
shown in the next section, policymakers have made important decisions about the regulatory 
structure of private school choice programs without the assistance of causal evidence linking 
regulations to the supply of private schools that participate in choice programs. 
Literature Review 
The private school marketplace relies on the ability of high-quality private schools to open and 
expand (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hess, 2010; McShane, 2015; McShane, 2018). However, very 
little empirical research exists examining government regulations’ impact on private school 
choice program participation. That shortcoming could be a function of the limited amount of 
variation in regulations across programs in the United States. Because of this weak variation, and 
since voucher program regulations are not randomly assigned to private schools in the United 
States, only one causal study exists on the topic (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2018). A few other 
empirical studies, however, offer suggestive evidence that regulations can have unintended 
consequences on the effectiveness of voucher programs. 
 The evaluation of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is the first random 
assignment study in the world to detect statistically significant negative effects of a private 
school voucher program on student achievement (Mills, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017; 
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Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018). Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Walters (2018) find 
evidence to suggest that lower quality private schools, as measured by student enrollment, are 
more likely to participate in the LSP. Other scholars report that only a third of the private schools 
in the state have participated in the highly regulated LSP, whereas over twice that proportion 
have elected to participate in less regulated school choice programs in other areas (Sude, 
DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018). Descriptive studies have also found that lower quality schools, as 
measured by tuition, enrollment, and customer reviews, tend to be more likely to participate in 
voucher programs, on average (DeAngelis & Hoarty, 2018; Sude, DeAngelis & Wolf, 2018). 
Similarly, Stuit and Doan (2013) find that higher levels of U.S. voucher program regulatory 
burdens are associated with lower levels of private school participation. Private school leaders in 
Louisiana, Indiana, and Florida have expressed concerns over voucher program regulations 
(Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015). Additionally, DeAngelis and Burke (2017) report evidence 
to suggest that voucher program regulations homogenize the supply of private schools overall.  
 Although the existing studies provide some evidence that regulations reduce program 
participation, only one previous study is a true experiment (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2018). 
We fill this hole in the literature by conducting the second random-assignment study on the 
effects of regulation on the expressed intentions of private school leaders to participate or not in 
a school choice program. Our study builds upon the first evaluation in at least four important 
ways: (1) we examine two states, California and New York, that do not have any private school 
choice programs; (2) we add a nationally norm-referenced testing requirement as a new 
regulatory treatment; (3) we include two customer review metrics as proxies for school quality; 
and, (4) we analyze subgroup effects by school specialization.  
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Data and Research Design 
We obtained a complete list of 4,825 individual private schools in September of 2018. We used 
the California Private Schools Directory located at the California Department of Education’s 
website to find a complete list of 3,076 private schools in the Eureka State.
1
 We used the 
Directory of Public and Nonpublic Schools and Administrators in New York State, located on 
the New York State Department of Education’s website, to find a complete list of 1,749 private 
schools in the Empire State.
2
 These data sources provided us with contact information for the 
private school leaders and school background characteristics such as address, city, grades served, 
school level, religious affiliation, and student enrollment.  
We randomly assigned each private school to one of five groups, the control group or one 
of four different experimental groups, using the complete list of 4,825 private schools. Each of 
the five groups received a survey containing 10 identical questions about basic school and leader 
background characteristics that were used as control variables. The 11
th
 and final question in 
each of the five surveys differed experimentally. The control group’s eleventh question asked “If 
your state launched a new school choice program next academic year, with a value of $6,000 per 
student, per year, how likely is it that your school would participate in the program? Note: This 
program would not require any changes in school operations or additional government 
regulations.” The first treatment group, capturing the effect of open-enrollment policy, had a note 
on question 11 indicating “The only requirement would be that your school would have to accept 
all students who applied (and you would be required to use a random lottery for admissions in 
the case of oversubscription).” The second treatment group, capturing the effect of state 
standardized testing requirements on program participation, had a note on question 11 indicating 
                                                     
1
 Private Schools. California Department of Education. Retrieved from https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/ps/. 
2
 Directory of Public and Nonpublic Schools and Administrators in New York State. New York State Department of 
Education. Retrieved from http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/schoolDirectory/. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349453 
8 
 
“The only requirement would be that every student would have to take the state standardized 
tests each year.” The third treatment group, capturing the effect of nationally norm-referenced 
standardized testing requirements on program participation, had a note on question 11 indicating 
“The only requirement would be that every student would have to take nationally norm-
referenced standardized tests each year.” The final treatment group, capturing the effect of a 
parent copayment prohibition, had a note on question 11 indicating “The only requirement would 
be that your school would have to accept the voucher amount ($6,000) as full payment for 
voucher students.” The full survey instrument can be found in the Appendix. 
Out of the complete list of 4,825 schools, we randomly assigned 4,732 of the private 
schools to one of the five experimental groups. We dropped 93 (1.93 percent) of the original 
observations because they were missing email addresses. We assigned 964 schools to the control 
group (no regulations), 926 to the state standardized testing treatment, 966 to the open-
enrollment treatment, 934 to the copay prohibition treatment, and 942 to the nationally norm-
referenced standardized testing treatment (Table 1). Because of duplicates and bounced emails, 
we actually sent out 898 emails to the control group, 858 emails to the state testing group, 865 
emails to the open-enrollment group, 843 emails to the copay prohibition group, and 862 emails 
to the nationally norm-referenced testing group for a total potential sample size of 4,322 private 
schools. We sent initial emails on September 12, 2018 at 1:37pm ET, first reminders on 
September 18, 2018 at 2:37pm ET, second reminders on September 24, 2018 at 1:33pm ET, third 
reminders on September 28, 2018 at 1:32pm ET, fourth reminders on October 4, 2018 at 1:38pm 
ET, fifth reminders on October 10, 2018 at 12:37pm ET, and final reminders on October 18, 
2018 at 1:59pm ET. 
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We received 356 total survey responses by October 26, 2018 for a total response rate of 
8.24 percent. As shown in Table 1 below, none of the four treatment groups’ response rates were 
statistically different from the control group’s response rate. 









Assigned 964 966 926 942 934 
Emailed 898 865 854 862 843 
Surveys Started 173 142 151 154 149 
Responded 73 68 75 68 72 
Start Rate 19.27% 16.42% 17.68% 17.87% 17.67% 
Response Rate 8.13% 7.86% 8.78% 7.89% 8.54% 
Completion Rate 42.20% 47.89% 49.67% 44.16% 48.32% 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a chi-squared test 
for each treatment column. “Emailed” excludes observations with duplicate emails and observations with emails that 
bounced. “Start Rate” equals “Surveys Started” divided by “Emailed.” “Response Rate” equals “Responded” 




One way to test for potential bias arising from low response rates is to check for equivalence on 
observable characteristics. As shown in Table 2 below, individual t-tests do not detect any 
differences across any of the 33 observable characteristics between the control group and the two 
standardized testing treatment groups at the 95 percent level of confidence. One statistically 
significant difference emerges for the copay prohibition treatment group. This finding suggests 
that the respondents to the copay prohibition treatment group are more likely to classify 
themselves as “other leaders” than respondents in the control group. This one difference, 
however, could very well be a type I error or “false discovery” given the large number of 
statistical comparisons being made. 
We detect five statistically significant differences between the control group and the 
open-enrollment treatment group, suggesting that respondents in the open-enrollment group were 
more likely to report that they were “other leaders,” that they were “alternative” school leaders, 
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and that they were leaders of “K-12 schools” than were respondents in the control group. The 
respondents in the open-enrollment group were less likely to report that they were leaders of 
“regular” schools and “K-8” schools. Table 2 demonstrates moderate evidence that 
randomization worked and, therefore, that our estimates are reasonably unbiased. That said, we 
also provide results from models using all control variables. 
 In theory, differences on observables detected for the open-enrollment group could 
introduce bias into the analysis if the leaders also opted into responding to that particular survey 
based on unobservable characteristics. However, the most plausible reason for selection bias into 
the open-enrollment survey has to do with the potential for strong social desirability bias 
(Phillips & Clancy, 1972). If the school leaders perceived that the survey results would be 
published online (although we assured them that their individual responses would be kept 
completely confidential), they would have an incentive to avoid responding to the open-
enrollment survey if their school did not want to take all students at random. Even if the leaders 
had good intentions, a response indicating that they did not want to use random lottery 
admissions could be bad publicity because the categorical response does not allow for a nuanced 
discussion of the actual policy. This social desirability bias would not be as likely to deter 
leaders who are comfortable with an open-enrollment regulation from responding to the survey. 
This type of bias would also not be as likely to deter leaders in the control group from opting out 
of the survey, as school leaders presumably would perceive little, if any, negative connotation 
associated with not wanting to participate in a school choice program without any additional 
regulations.  
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California 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.72 
New York 0.29 0.35 0.32 0.21 0.28 
Asian 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Hispanic 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 
Black 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.03 
White 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.83 
Pacific Islander 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Other Race 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Female 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.72 0.71 
Male 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.28 0.29 
Principal 0.66 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.61 
Administrator 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 
Director 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.13 
Other Leader 0.01 0.09* 0.05 0.07+ 0.10* 
Regular School 0.71 0.53* 0.64 0.65 0.76 
Montessori School 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Early Childhood School 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Alternative School 0.11 0.24* 0.09 0.18 0.11 
SPED School 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 
Specialized School 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.03 
Elementary School 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.13 
K-8 School 0.38 0.18** 0.27 0.26 0.40 
K-12 School 0.11 0.28* 0.11 0.16 0.11 
9-12 School 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 
Junior Senior School 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 
Senior High School 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Latitude of Response 37.26 37.26 37.54 37.07 37.19 
Longitude of Response -105.08 -104.33 -104.69 -110.62 -106.60 
Enrollment  270 237.46 234 187.84+ 247.60 
Google Score 4.46 4.26 4.31 4.38 4.40 
GreatSchools Score 4.09 4.15 4.23 4.27 4.20 
Tuition (Dollars) 11,149 15,168+ 11,786 12,464 12,609 
Religious (CA Only) 0.73 0.55+ 0.57+ 0.67 0.77 
N 73 68 75 68 72 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a t-test for each 
treatment column. 
 
As explained in DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf (2018), the bias introduced into the results for 
the open-enrollment treatment condition should be upwards in direction, meaning the obtained 
rate of “yes” responses to participating is higher than the true rate would be in the absence of 
non-response. This upward bias in the “yes” responses would make it more difficult to detect the 
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theorized negative effect of regulation on program participation. This means that any detected 
negative effects for the open-enrollment regulatory treatment could be lower bounds of the true 
estimates. The best explanation for this occurrence is the potential social desirability bias 
introduced by the randomly assigned note regarding open-enrollment. 
External Validity 
Although we do not find evidence to suggest a problem of internal validity, a low overall 
response rate of 8.42 percent may limit the external validity of our results. Our sample of 
respondents might not be representative of the entire population of private school leaders in 
California and New York, so the results might not be generalizable to all private schools in these 
states. However, we do have access to some observable characteristics for all schools on the list 
of 4,825 private schools from the states’ Department of Education websites. As shown in Table 3 
below, out of the 10 observable characteristics that we have for respondents’ schools and all 
schools, state, city (New York only), K-8 school, K-12 school, grades 9-12 school, elementary 
school, whether the school is religious (California only), and whether the school is co-
educational (California only), four statistically significant differences emerge between the 
sample of respondents and the total private school population. At the 95 percent level of 
confidence, the respondents’ schools in our sample are 6.5 percentage points more likely than the 
population average to be located in California, 8.5 percentage points more likely to be a K-8 
school, 7.9 percentage points less likely to be located in Brooklyn, and 6.7 percentage points 
more likely to have a religious affiliation. Descriptive statistics of the full analytic sample can be 
found in Table 4 below. The distribution of expected program participation responses across all 
three states, including Florida, can be found in Table 5 below. 
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Population (#) Population (%) 
California 253 71.07* 3057 64.60 
Elementary School 54 15.17 908 19.19+ 
K-8 School 107 30.06*** 1022 21.60 
K-12 School 58 16.29 849 17.94 
9-12 School 20 5.62 228 4.82 
Brooklyn (City) 13 12.62 343 20.48* 
Bronx (City) 7 6.80 88 5.25 
New York (City) 13 12.62 172 10.27 
Religious (CA Only) 167 66.01* 1812 59.27 
Coed (CA Only) 244 96.44 2965 96.99 
N 356 356 4732 4732 
Notes: + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Statistical significance was calculated using a chi-squared test. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max N 
Participation Number 3.29 1.36 1 5 354 
Certain to Participate 0.22 0.42 0 1 354 
Female 0.65 0.48 0 1 356 
Male 0.35 0.48 0 1 356 
Black 0.05 0.22 0 1 356 
Hispanic 0.05 0.23 0 1 356 
White 0.77 0.42 0 1 356 
Principal 0.60 0.49 0 1 356 
Director 0.18 0.38 0 1 356 
Regular School 0.66 0.47 0 1 356 
SPED School 0.05 0.23 0 1 356 
Montessori School 0.06 0.24 0 1 356 
Specialized School 0.05 0.23 0 1 356 
Alternative School 0.14 0.35 0 1 356 
K-8 School 0.30 0.46 0 1 356 
K-12 School 0.16 0.37 0 1 356 
9-12 School 0.06 0.23 0 1 356 
Elementary School 0.15 0.36 0 1 356 
Religious School (CA) 0.66 0.47 0 1 253 
Google Review Score 4.37 0.70 1 5 315 
GreatSchools Review Score 4.19 0.77 1 5 310 
Tuition ($) 12,597 13,547 0 99,100 356 
Enrollment 236 290 5 312 356 
Enrollment Change (%) 21.11 220.03 -79.22 3000 238 
California 0.71 0.45 0 1 356 
New York 0.29 0.45 0 1 356 
Note: “Tuition” includes 2 imputed observations generated from multiple imputation regression. 
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Table 5: Distribution of Participation by State (Control Group) 
 








California 13.46 1.92 28.85 21.15 34.62 
      
New York 4.76 14.29 19.05 38.10 21.81 
      
Florida 8.70 3.26 19.57 34.78 33.70 
      
Notes: “Florida” refers to data from DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf (2018). The percent of control group respondents 
selecting each participation status is shown in each column. California has 52 observations, New York has 21, and 
Florida has 92. 
 
Methods 
We employ an ordered probit regression approach of the form: 
Prob (Participationi2018) = β0 + β1Open_Enrolli2018 + β2State_Testi2018 + β3National_Testi2018 + 
β4No_Copayi2018 + β5Xi2018 + εit 
Where the categorical dependent variable of interest Participation captures school leader i’s 
expectation of participation in a hypothetical private school choice program in 2018. The 
dependent variable is the private school leader’s response on survey question 11, a Likert Scale 
ordered from one to five, with one indicating that the leader is “certain not to participate” and 
five indicating that the leader is “certain to participate.” We use ordered probit regression (and 
ordered logit regression as a robustness check) because the dependent variable of interest is 
ordered and categorical. When interpreting marginal effects, we focus on the relative likelihood 
of private school leaders to choose the fifth outcome category (“certain to participate”). 
 Because effective random assignment eliminates the need for controls, the base model 
only includes the three treatment indicators as independent variables. The first binary 
independent variable of interest, Open_Enroll, takes on the value of one if the private school was 
randomly assigned a random-admissions mandate, and zero otherwise. The second binary 
independent variable of interest, State_Test, takes on the value of one if the private school, i, was 
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randomly assigned a state standardized testing mandate in the note of question 11, and zero 
otherwise. The third binary independent variable of interest, National_Test, takes on the value of 
one if the private school was randomly assigned a nationally norm-referenced standardized 
testing mandate, and zero otherwise. The fourth binary independent variable of interest, 
No_Copay, takes on the value of one if the private school was randomly assigned a mandate 
stating that the school had to take the voucher funding as full-payment, and zero otherwise. We 
expect the coefficients on all four of these independent variables to be negative, indicating that 
these regulations reduce the likelihood of participation in private school choice programs. 
Random assignment alone does not absolutely guarantee that all endogeneity will be 
removed from the models. Because of this possibility, we also include models with vector X of 
observable control variables as robustness checks. These models control for the gender, race, and 
leadership positions of all respondents, school type, school level, state, tuition, and enrollment. 
Our main specification uses multiple-imputation for 2 missing tuition responses (0.56 percent of 
the overall analytic sample). Enders (2003) points out that missing data rates for education 
studies are regularly much higher than ours – between 15 and 20 percent. While there is not an 
exact cutoff for when the percentage of missing data becomes unacceptable, Schafer (1999) 
claims that missing rates below 5 percent are inconsequential, while Bennett (2001) contends 
that estimates are biased with missing rates exceeding 10 percent. Our multiple-imputation 
approach uses all other independent variables to impute missing tuition data (Rubin, 1987). We 
drop two observations (0.56 percent of the overall sample) that did not include a response to the 
participation question, since that is our dependent variable of interest. 
 
 




Although all coefficients are in the expected direction, indicating that regulation reduces 
program participation, only the effects of half of the program regulations are statistically 
significant (Table 6). The strongest and most precise negative effects appear for the open-
enrollment regulation mandating that participating private schools admit all interested students 
on a random basis. Depending on the specification, our results indicate that, relative to no 
restrictions, open-enrollment regulation reduces the likelihood that private school leaders are 
“certain to participate” by around 19 to 23 percentage points, or 60 to 73 percent (31.5 percent of 
the control group responded that they were “certain to participate”). These negative effects on 
participation are large, amounting to 40 to 49 percent of a standard deviation (“certain 
participation” had a standard deviation of 46.8 percent for the control group). 
Table 6: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation  
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment -0.226*** -0.229*** -0.197*** -0.189*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     
State Testing -0.104* -0.102* -0.090+ -0.092+ 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.057) (0.059) 
     
National Testing -0.050 -0.044 -0.025 -0.023 
 (0.355) (0.409) (0.636) (0.658) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.015 -0.021 -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.752) (0.644) (0.936) (0.772) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0214 0.0220 0.0876 0.0908 
N  354 354 354 354 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the last two columns use controls for the gender, 
race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, state, and school level. The last two columns use 
multiple-imputation for 4 missing tuition values.  
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Each model also detects negative effects for state standardized testing requirements. 
Depending on the model employed, we find that mandated state standardized testing using the 
official state accountability test reduces the likelihood private school leaders are “certain to 
participate” by 9 to over 10 percentage points, or about 29 to 33 percent. These effects are 
moderate in size, as they are equivalent to a 19 to 22 percent of a standard deviation reduction in 
certain program participation. While all of the coefficients measuring the effects of the nationally 
norm-referenced standardized testing mandate and the prohibition of copayment on participation 
are negative, none of them are statistically significant at even the marginal (p-value < 10 percent) 
level. It is not surprising that the state standardized testing mandate significantly decreases 
participation while the relationship is not statistically significant for the nationally norm-
referenced testing requirement. The state standardized testing mandate is more restrictive to 
private schools because it does not allow private school leaders to choose the standardized tests 
that their students take. In addition, adjustment costs may be lower for the nationally norm-
referenced testing mandate than the state testing requirement if private schools are already 
administering norm-referenced tests before the participation decision. 
 The few statistically significant control variable relationships are also worth noting. As 
found by Sude, DeAngelis, and Wolf (2018) and DeAngelis, Burke, and Wolf (2018) in other 
research, higher tuition schools are less likely to participate in school choice programs, all else 
being equal. In our sample, a $1,000 increase in tuition is associated with around a 0.55 
percentage point, or about a 1.75 percent, reduction in certain program participation, suggesting 
that higher quality (or at least more expensive) schools are less likely to participate in choice 
programs. “American Indian or Alaska Native” school leaders are 40 percentage points more 
likely to be certain to participate than white leaders. “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” 
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school leaders are 19 percentage points less likely to be certain to participate than white leaders, 
all else being equal. Leaders of Montessori schools are 16 percentage points less likely to be 
certain to participate than are leaders of regular schools, all else being equal, perhaps because 
regulations are more costly to their specialized educational models. Importantly, this negative 
relationship reported for Montessori schools is detected in another study using 2015-16 data 
from actual voucher program participation decisions in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Indiana; Ohio; 
Louisiana; D.C.; and North Carolina (DeAngelis, 2019). “Administrators” and “other leaders” 
were both about 11 percentage points less likely to be certain to participate than school 
principals, all else being equal. We do not detect any differences in participation proclivity by 
school level or state. 
As shown in Table 7 below, the outcome response category examined does not change 
the overall results. All effects are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level for open-
enrollment mandates (and at the p < 0.10 level for state testing requirements) across all five 
response categories. For example, the open-enrollment regulation increases the likelihood that 
private school leaders are “certain not to participate” by around 15 percentage points and state 
standardized testing requirements increase the likelihood that private school leaders are “certain 
not to participate” by around 7 percentage points. All categories are statistically insignificant for 
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Table 7: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Category 
 








Open-Enrollment 0.148*** 0.065*** 0.046*** -0.062*** -0.197*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
State Testing 0.068+ 0.030+ 0.021+ -0.028+ -0.090+ 
 (0.057) (0.068) (0.066) (0.064) (0.057) 
      
National Testing 0.019 0.008 0.006 -0.008 -0.025 
 (0.636) (0.636) (0.635) (0.636) (0.636) 
      
Copay Prohibition 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.936) (0.936) (0.936) (0.936) (0.936) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0876 0.0876 0.0876 0.0876 0.0876 
N  354 354 354 354 354 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All models employ ordered probit regression and use 
controls for the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, state, and school level. 




The general effects of the open enrollment and state testing mandates are to reduce the likelihood 
of a private school participating in a school choice program.  Do those general effects vary by 
state, school specialization, or proxy measures of school quality?  Here we explore that question. 
States 
The only statistically significant relationships detected are for the subsample from California, 
perhaps because less than one-third of the observations came from New York (Table 8). The 
negative effects detected in California are larger than the overall results. Specifically, we find 
that the open-enrollment regulation leads to a 23 to 27 percentage point, or 73 to 86 percent, 
reduction in the likelihood of “certain” participation in California and the state testing mandate 
leads to around a 15 percentage point, or 48 percent, reduction. The last two columns of Table 8 
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indicate that the larger effects for state standardized testing in California are statistically different 
from the effects in New York at the p < 0.10 level. While the coefficient on open-enrollment 
ranges from negative 10 to negative 15 percentage points for New York, suggesting a lower 
likelihood of program participation, none of our models detect statistically significant effects for 
the Empire State, as the p-values range from 10.4 percent to 27.6 percent. In addition, we do not 
find evidence that the effects for open-enrollment mandates are statistically different across 
states. No effects are detected for the nationally norm-referenced testing mandate or the 
prohibition of copayment for either state; however, we find evidence to suggest that the effects of 
copay prohibition differ across states, as the positive coefficient on the copay prohibition in New 
York is significantly different from the negative coefficient on the same copay prohibition in 
California. Such a heterogeneous effect could be explained by differences in financial security 
and social responsibility in private schools across the two states. 
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Table 8: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (by State) 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment (CA) -0.267*** -0.271*** -0.230*** -0.234*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Open-Enrollment (NY) -0.147 -0.148 -0.120 -0.097 
 (0.104) (0.111) (0.155) (0.276) 
Difference 0.119 0.123 0.111 0.137 
 (0.296) (0.290) (0.300) (0.220) 
State Testing (CA) -0.155* -0.150* -0.147* -0.153* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) 
     
State Testing (NY) 0.007 -0.006 0.035 0.036 
 (0.931) (0.934) (0.645) (0.654) 
Difference 0.162 0.143 0.182+ 0.189+ 
 (0.111) (0.158) (0.061) (0.059) 
National Testing (CA) -0.055 -0.054 -0.030 -0.038 
 (0.387) (0.395) (0.621) (0.534) 
     
National Testing (NY) -0.035 -0.013 0.013 -0.018 
 (0.753) (0.907) (0.913) (0.850) 
Difference 0.020 0.041 -0.013 0.019 
 (0.876) (0.750) (0.913) (0.864) 
Copay Prohibition (CA) -0.057 -0.065 -0.051 -0.067 
 (0.311) (0.240) (0.344) (0.212) 
     
Copay Prohibition (NY) 0.106 0.103 0.122 0.126 
 (0.217) (0.194) (0.136) (0.123) 
Difference -0.057 0.168+ 0.173+ 0.193* 
 (0.311) (0.083) (0.075) (0.046) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0303 0.0302 0.0929 0.0963 
N  354 354 354 354 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” Models in the first two columns include interactions 
between each treatment and state and an indicator variable for state. Models in the last two columns use controls for 
the gender, race, and position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, and school level. The last two 








In theory, private schools with educational models already mirroring the practices of the 
traditional public schools face lower adjustment costs associated with program participation. In 
other words, specialized private schools should be less likely to participate in voucher programs 
than private schools that already mirror public school practices. Previous correlational work has 
found that more specialized private schools are less likely to participate in voucher programs 
(DeAngelis, 2019), and voucher program regulations might lead to less specialization over time 
(DeAngelis & Burke, 2017). 
Table 9 below presents the first experimental evidence regarding whether or not more 
specialized schools are more likely to be deterred by voucher program regulations. We find that 
the open-enrollment mandate reduces the likelihood that non-regular private school leaders 
report “certain” participation by around 24 to 27 percentage points, or 76 to 86 percent. This 
negative effect is only around 16 to 17 percentage points, or 51 to 54 percent, for regular private 
schools. However, while the coefficients differ in size, the differences are not statistically 
significant. In fact, no statistically significant heterogeneous effects are found for any of the four 
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Table 9: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (by School Specialization) 
 









Open-Enrollment (Non-Regular) -0.266** -0.241* -0.251** -0.240* 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) 
     
Open-Enrollment (Regular) -0.159* -0.170* -0.167* -0.165* 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) 
Difference  0.107 0.070 0.084 0.075 
 (0.365) (0.558) (0.444) (0.518) 
State Testing (Non-Regular) -0.103 -0.089 -0.087 -0.100 
 (0.264) (0.343) (0.315) (0.283) 
     
State Testing (Regular) -0.092 -0.093+ -0.094+ -0.093 
 (0.118) (0.098) (0.091) (0.104) 
Difference 0.011 -0.004 -0.007 0.007 
 (0.919) (0.972) (0.946) (0.948) 
National Testing (Non-Regular) -0.114 -0.109 -0.087 -0.100 
 (0.266) (0.301) (0.397) (0.363) 
     
National Testing (Regular) -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.005 
 (0.930) (0.932) (0.985) (0.924) 
Difference 0.109 0.104 0.088 0.106 
 (0.362) (0.384) (0.444) (0.377) 
Copay Prohibition (Non-Regular) -0.027 -0.017 -0.035 -0.046 
 (0.770) (0.854) (0.706) (0.626) 
     
Copay Prohibition (Regular) -0.018 -0.027 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.743) (0.599) (0.879) (0.953) 
Difference 0.009 -0.010 0.043 0.043 
 (0.930) (0.924) (0.685) (0.682) 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0391 0.0400 0.0890 0.0921 
N  354 354 354 354 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 4 independent variables of interest are interacted with 
whether the private school is classified as “non-regular.” Models in the first two columns control for whether the 
private school is classified as “non-regular.” Models in the last two columns also use controls for gender, race, and 
position of respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, state, and school level. All columns use multiple-









Regulations could most deter higher-quality schools from participating in private school choice 
programs. Lower-quality private schools may be more likely to participate in voucher programs, 
regardless of the additional regulations, because they are more likely to be in great need of 
financial resources and enrollment. On the other hand, leaders of higher-quality private schools 
may be less likely to accept voucher regulations if they perceive that the additional regulations 
might alter the educational models that are already working for their students and in demand by 
their paying customers.  
Four empirical evaluations have found that higher quality private schools, as measured by 
tuition, enrollment, and customer reviews, are less likely to participate in voucher programs in 
Chile and across the U.S. (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Walters, 2018; DeAngelis & Hoarty, 
2018; Sánchez, 2018; Sude, DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018). However, none of these studies are able 
to determine whether regulations or other factors deterred higher-quality private schools from 
participating in voucher programs. Our previous experimental evaluation was the first to 
examine that question rigorously. We found limited evidence to suggest that regulations were 
more likely to deter higher-quality private schools, as measured by tuition and enrollment trends, 
from participating in a hypothetical voucher program in Florida (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 
2018). 
 The tables below report more evidence regarding the question of whether or not 
regulations are more likely to deter higher quality private schools than lower quality ones from 
voucher program participation. Each of the models uses an interaction term for each of the four 
regulations and the quality metrics. We perform subgroup analyses using four proxies for private 
school quality: reported school tuition levels, enrollment trends from the 2013-14 school year to 
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the 2015-16 school year as reported by the Private School Universe Survey, Google review 
scores, and GreatSchools review scores. Tuition levels represent the price families are willing to 
pay for the school’s educational services, enrollment trends represent the explicit change in 
demand for the school’s educational services over time, and customer reviews represent 
customer satisfaction levels. Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Walters (2018) found that tuition 
levels and enrollment trends in private schools in Louisiana were both positively associated with 
their experimental impacts on student achievement. 
We find limited evidence to suggest that higher quality schools, as measured by customer 
review scores, are more likely to be deterred by voucher program regulations. All coefficients on 
open-enrollment mandates, state testing requirements, and copay prohibition are in the expected 
negative direction for Google review scores; however, only one analytic model detects 
marginally significant effects for one regulation (Table 10). Specifically, our ordered logit model 
without additional controls suggests that a one-unit increase (on a five-unit scale) in Google 
review score is associated with a 14.5 percentage point larger negative effect of the state testing 
mandate on certain program participation; however, the three other analytic models do not 
produce statistically significant interaction results, as they have p-values between 11.4 percent 
and 14.1 percent. While no overall quality-reducing effects are detected based on GreatSchools 
review scores, all coefficients are in the expected negative direction (Table 11). Our measures of 
average Google and GreatSchools review scores are continuous and range from 1 to 5. We find 
no evidence overall to suggest that schools with higher tuition (Table 12) or higher enrollment 
trends (Table 13) are more likely to be deterred by any of the four regulations. This result is 
surprising as our previous experimental evaluation in Florida detected statistically significant 
effects for both of these interaction terms (DeAngelis, Burke, & Wolf, 2018). 
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Table 10: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation (by Google Review Score) 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment -0.074 -0.079 -0.103 -0.112 
 (0.352) (0.310) (0.159) (0.128) 
     
State Testing -0.128 -0.145+ -0.118 -0.130 
 (0.141) (0.098) (0.136) (0.114) 
     
National Testing -0.021 -0.030 0.031 0.019 
 (0.798) (0.710) (0.680) (0.799) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.033 -0.055 -0.016 -0.040 
 (0.717) (0.580) (0.832) (0.617) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0267 0.0280 0.1043 0.1081 
N  313 313 313 313 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 4 independent variables of interest are interacted with 
average Google customer review score (a continuous measure on a 5-point scale). The table reports the coefficient 
on the continuous interaction term for each treatment and model. Models in the first two columns control for Google 
review score. Models in the last two columns also use controls for gender, race, and position of respondents, school 
type, tuition, enrollment, state, and school level. All columns use multiple-imputation for 4 missing tuition values. 
All columns show the coefficients of the interaction terms. All models drop 41 observations (11.58 percent of the 
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Table 11: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by GreatSchools Review Score 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment -0.067 -0.059 -0.074 -0.064 
 (0.384) (0.488) (0.316) (0.451) 
     
State Testing -0.080 -0.067 -0.039 -0.032 
 (0.267) (0.393) (0.598) (0.699) 
     
National Testing -0.115 -0.102 -0.106 -0.084 
 (0.224) (0.313) (0.226) (0.378) 
     
Copay Prohibition -0.096 -0.085 -0.099 -0.100 
 (0.159) (0.246) (0.113) (0.152) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0236 0.0236 0.0952 0.0958 
N  309 309 309 309 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 4 independent variables of interest are interacted with 
average GreatSchools customer review score (a continuous measure on a 5-point scale). Models in the first two 
columns control for GreatSchools review score. The table reports the coefficient on the continuous interaction term 
for each treatment and model. Models in the last two columns also use controls for gender, race, and position of 
respondents, school type, tuition, enrollment, state, and school level. All columns use multiple-imputation for 4 
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Table 12: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Tuition 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.406) (0.549) (0.672) (0.603) 
     
State Testing -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.604) (0.707) (0.820) (0.886) 
     
National Testing 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.002 
 (0.806) (0.915) (0.436) (0.656) 
     
Copay Prohibition 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.619) (0.549) (0.765) (0.779) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0414 0.0425 0.0893 0.0917 
N  354 354 354 354 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 4 independent variables of interest are interacted with 
reported private school tuition (a continuous measure reported in thousands of U.S. dollars). The table reports the 
coefficient on the continuous interaction term for each treatment and model. Models in the first two columns control 
for tuition. Models in the last two columns also use controls for gender, race, and position of respondents, school 
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Table 13: Effects of Regulations on Reported Participation by Enrollment Change 
 
 Participation Participation Participation Participation 
 (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) (Ordered Probit) (Ordered Logit) 
Open-Enrollment -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.739) (0.626) (0.698) (0.646) 
     
State Testing 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.811) (0.838) (0.445) (0.419) 
     
National Testing 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.424) (0.503) (0.698) (0.858) 
     
Copay Prohibition 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.334) (0.388) (0.480) (0.614) 
     
Controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0229 0.0237 0.1144 0.1216 
N  237 237 237 237 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Average marginal effects are reported 
for the last outcome category of “certain to participate.” All 4 independent variables of interest are interacted with 
private school enrollment change from the 2013-14 school year to the 2015-16 school year (in percentage points). 
The table reports the coefficient on the continuous interaction term for each treatment and model. Models in the first 
two columns control for enrollment change. Models in the last two columns also use controls for gender, race, and 
position of respondents, school type, tuition, state, and school level. All columns use multiple-imputation for 4 
missing tuition values. All models drop 117 observations (33.05 percent of the sample) missing data for enrollment 
change. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
As with the prior study in Florida, this study has important limitations. Even though the data 
collection instrument was administered in the field, the study was designed as a lab experiment 
(Blom-Hansen, Morton, & Serritzlew, 2015). Participants were presented with a hypothetical 
situation and asked to describe their likely behavioral response. To the extent that the 
hypothetical situation, which in this case is a private school voucher program with an average 
voucher amount and a randomly assigned regulatory framework, did not seem real to the 
participants, their responses may not reflect how they would behave when making an actual 
private school choice participation decision. Only 8.24 percent of private school principals across 
the two states responded to the survey. Respondents were similar to non-respondents on 
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descriptive characteristics of their schools. If any survey non-response bias exists in our analysis, 
it is likely biasing our results towards zero for the one category of respondents (assigned the 
open-enrollment requirement) in which we observe the largest and most consistently significant 
negative effects. Finally, our study examined the effect of a single government regulation on the 
anticipation of private school leaders to participate or not in a private school choice program. 
Just about every voucher program in the U.S. comes with packages of regulations, which may 
have different effects on expected participation than specific regulations. Experimental research 
linking packages of regulations to expected and actual participation decisions would be 
especially helpful for policymakers.     
The findings presented in this study suggest that certain regulations levied on a private 
school choice program reduce the likelihood of private school participation. As was the case in 
Florida, we find that regulations that would restrict the autonomy of private school leaders, 
specifically open-enrollment mandates and state standardized testing requirements,  significantly 
reduce the likelihood that private school leaders expect to be “certain to participate” in a new 
private school voucher program. As noted above, the open-enrollment regulation decreases the 
likelihood that private school leaders are “certain to participate” by around 19 percentage points 
and state standardized testing requirements decrease the likelihood that private school leaders are 
“certain to participate” by around 9 percentage points. All general findings are statistically 
insignificant for the prohibition of parental copayment and nationally norm-referenced testing 
requirements. Much more research is needed on the intersection between school choice 
regulations and private school participation decisions. In particular, more research on the effects 
of school choice regulations on the average quality and specialization of participating schools is 
needed to better inform policymakers.  
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Appendix: Survey Instrument 
Control Group 
Q1: I agree to participate in this study and have read the consent form. 
 True 
False 
Q2: What is your first name? 
Q3: What is your last name? 
Q4: What is the name of your school? 




 Other Leader 
Q6: Please describe your race/ethnicity 
 White or Caucasian 
 Black or African American 
 Hispanic or Latino 
 Asian or Asian American 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
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Q8: Which of the following best describes this school or program? 
 Regular school 
 Montessori school 
 Special  program emphasis school (such as science or math school, performing arts 
schools, talented or gifted school, etc.) 
 Special education school (primarily serves students with disabilities) 
 Career/Technical/Vocational school (primarily serves students being trained for 
occupations) 
 Early childhood program or day care center (such as kindergarten only, prekindergarten 
and kindergarten only, day care and transitional kindergarten only, etc.) 
 Alternative / other school (offers a curriculum designed to provide alternative or 
nontraditional education; does not specifically fall into the other categories listed) 
Q9: What is your school’s total enrollment? 
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Q11: If your state launched a new school choice program next academic year, with a value of 
$6,000 per student, per year, how likely is it that your school would participate in the program? 
Note: This program would not require any changes in school operations or additional 
government regulations 
Certain not to participate 
Very little chance 
Some chance 
Very good chance 
Certain to participate 
Treatment Group One 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q11 says “The only requirement would be 
that every student would have to take the state standardized tests each year.” 
Treatment Group Two 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q11 says “The only requirement would be 
that your school would have to accept all students who applied (and you would be required to 
use random lottery for admissions in the case of oversubscription).” 
Treatment Group Three 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q11 says “The only requirement would be 
that your school would have to accept the voucher amount ($6,000) as full payment for voucher 
students.” 
Treatment Group Four 
Exactly the same as Control Group, but the note on Q11 says “The only requirement would be 
that every student would have to take nationally norm-referenced standardized tests each year.” 
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